【After Winning Majority in LegCo: Beijing's Crackdown May Trigger International Intervention】
***感謝Hong Kong Columns - Translated,將我早前撰寫『議會過半想像:以「#國際攬炒」反制「臨立會2.0」』長文(https://www.facebook.com/joshuawongchifung/photos/a.313299448762570/2887650867994069/)翻譯成英文,鼓勵國際社會關注立會選舉一旦過半的沙盤推演,在最惡劣形勢下的制衡策略。***
中文精簡版本:https://www.facebook.com/joshuawongchifung/photos/a.564294826996363/2888641404561682/
Hongkongers have experienced our revolution for over half a year. They no longer take a consequentialist view to the effectiveness of their movement as they did years ago, or waste time second-guessing the intentions and background of fellow activists. Following the defensive battles at CUHK and PolyU, November’s District Council election saw a great victory of unity. More marvellous is the union between peaceful and “valiant” protesters.
In the process of resisting tyranny, the people have realised that one cannot prioritize one strategy over another. This is also how the common goal of “35+” came into being—the hope that we will win over half of the seats in the Legislative Council (LegCo) this September, such that the political spectrum that represents the majority of Hongkongers is able to gain control of legislative decisions. The political clout of Hongkongers will increase if 35 or more seats are successfully secured on our side. It is certainly one vital step to achieve the five demands within the system.
The possibility of realizing legislative majority
Technically it is not unrealistic to win a majority even under the current undemocratic system. Back in the 2016 LegCo election, we already won 30 seats. In addition to the District Council (First) functional constituency seat that is already in the pocket of the pan-democrats, as long as the candidates in Kowloon East and New Territories West do not start infighting again, we could safely secure 33 seats based on the number of pan-dem votes in 2016.
The other 3 seats required to achieve a majority depend on democrats’ breakthrough among the functional constituencies by dispersing the resources of the Liaison Office. They also count on whether the turnout this September could exceed 71.2% — that of last year’s District Council elections. Some of the factors that could affect the turnout include: will the epidemic persist into the summer? Will there be potential violent repression of protests in the 2 weeks preceding the election? Will Hong Kong-US relations be affected by the downturn of the global economy?
Therefore, the ambition of “35+” is to be prioritised by the resistance as both a means and an end. I have already expressed my support for an intra-party primary at the coordination meeting. In the meantime, it is pleasing to see the ongoing debates reaching a consensus of maximising the seats among geographical constituencies in the upcoming election.
Whilst enthusiastic coordination, we should also assess the post-election landscape and gauge Beijing’s reactions: if we do not reach 35 seats, Hong Kong will be subject to tighter control and more severe repression by China; but if the democratic parties successfully form a majority in LegCo, CCP’s fears of a “constitutional crisis” would become imminent. Hence, the key questions are how the Pan-Democrats should deal with the volatile political situation in Hong Kong and how they are going to meet Beijing’s charge head-on.
Watching out for Beijing’s dismissal of LegCo after reaching majority
To take back control of LegCo such that it faithfully reflects the majority’s principles and needs is the definition of a healthy democracy. Recently, however, DAB’s Tam Yiu-chung has warned that the plan of the Pan-Dems to “usurp power” in the LegCo would only lead to Beijing’s forceful disqualification of certain members or the interpretation of the Basic Law. This proves that winning a majority in LegCo is not only a popular conception but also a realistic challenge that would get on the nerves of Beijing. Could Beijing accept a President James To in LegCo? These unknown variables must be addressed upon achieving a majority.
While there is no telltale sign as to Beijing’s exact strategy, we are already familiar with the way CCP manipulated the Basic Law in the past 4 years. Having experienced three waves of disqualifications in LegCo, twice kicked out of LegCo with my team, and thrice locked up in jail, I have no false hopes of an easy compromise from Beijing: they would not let Pan-Dems control LegCo for half a year and wait (as is the proper procedure) until after having negatived the Budget to dissolve the legislature, and thereby giving them an easy victory in the re-elections. The greater the Pan-Dems threaten Beijing’s rule in Hong Kong, the more likely that it will trigger Beijing’s repression.
Since the disqualification and arrest of lawmakers have already become “normalised”, one can even imagine the police stepping into the LegCo building to force Pan-Dems into voting. Neither is it beyond our imagination to expect the CCP to kick out all 70 lawmakers in a fit of rage and replace them with a provisional LegCo “2.0” [HKCT note: The first was from 25 Jan 1997 to 30 Jun 1998]. To depend on a majority that could lead to a chapter of a “new testament” for One Country, Two Systems is perhaps what many elites long for, but they are overly optimistic:for a ticket to the promised land will not be available at the Chief Executive election campaign a year and a half later.
Admittedly, the Pan-Dems cannot unilaterally initiate “Laam-chaau” [HKCT note: mostly translated into “scorched-earth” mentality or “mutual destruction”; some even translated into “If I burn, you burn with us”]. The most they can do is to force a standstill of the government, and not for long the LegCo will have been eliminated from the equation to make the wheels turn again. It all leaves the plan of “Negativing the motion → Dissolving LegCo → Re-election after re-election → the stepping down of Carrie Lam” merely as overly positive speculation, probably resulting from their overestimate of CCP's capacity for rational calculation. The Pan-Dems must guard their frontlines and recognise what the biggest threat from Hong Kong to China could be. In this case, should LegCo sessions be disrupted or suspended, the Pan-Dems would have to be well prepared to surmount the expected obstacles and prevent the disqualification crisis 4 years ago—a Catch-22 indeed.
Productive tension from global intervention: Using Laam-chaau against the CCP
What aggravates the CCP the most is the potential threat to Hong Kong’s unique status as the one and only “separate customs territory”. Any miscalculation will compromise its role as the Chinese economy’s “white gloves”. Imagine if CCP were to disqualify all 70 elected lawmakers and convene a meeting north of the Shenzhen River to pass a resolution to Hong Kong’s affairs (much like the Provisional Legislative Council “1.0" in 1997), how great will the shock be in a world with an effective Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act? However hard it is to predict the future one thing is certain: With the US presidential election just around the corner, blows to the separation of powers would not be tolerated, and the West would necessarily effect countermeasures against the Hong Kong government.
Beijing has been relying upon Hong Kong to navigate the international community for decades. While clamping down on the political freedom of the cosmopolitan city, Beijing desires to maintain the financial centre’s economic freedom. Hence, we started lobbying for the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act four years ago, and today we are determined to promote “Laam-chaau” on an international scale.
The will of the voters must be reflected in an election. If a “35+” legislature were to be dismissed and replaced, such flagrant violation of democracy would assuredly cause a greater backlash than the infamous extradition bill. Knowing what the reality ahead of us could be, we have to combine our election and international strategies to oppose the placement of a 35+ LegCo with an “Emergency Legislative Council 2.0”, to advance an international “Laam-chaau” to Hong Kong’s status as “separate customs territory”. Only then will we stand a chance to resist the regime and to realise the five demands.
Adjusting our mindset: Overcoming the “constitutional crisis” to reach a resolution
Upon the realization of the “35+” LegCo, it is expected that the CCP will launch a devastating counterattack. The Pan-Dems should not expect LegCo to run normally; neither can the lawmakers realise their governing blueprints they have for Hong Kong. Rather, candidates will be able to compete against one another with visions of a liberated Hong Kong through popular vote. Bringing this point up has nothing to do with undermining the common goal of reaching a majority in LegCo, but rather channels the battle of LegCo to positive use upon the rule of law’s death and a “constitutional crisis” ahead. Knowing that Hongkongers have nothing to fall back on, all Pan-Dems should not miss the only way to the realization of “35+”.
Thus, be they partisans, nonpartisans, incumbent politicians, amateur politicians, or the civil society as a whole – if we stay in the political discourse of 2016 and continue to perpetuate old stereotypes, that is to deal with the divisions on the pan-democratic camp by favouring the most “local” faction; to consider only resource allocation and self-aggrandizement as the purpose of a LegCo campaign; to ignore how potential lawmakers are fitted to what specific roles; to turn a blind eye to the journey of resistance since last summer (extending indefinitely into the future)—They would lead as astray and cost us lose a precious opportunity for change by winning a 35+ majority.
The extent to which the pan-democrats can stay united in light of the political atmosphere since last summer is another problem that our side must to address. Before the watershed moment of 12th June 2019, many democratic delegates were trapped in the mentality of needing to “preserve people’s livelihood”, “be content of what we have accomplished”, and other strategies that favours stability. As the government refuses to heed to the five demands, whether the democrats, especially those in the functional constituencies, have the political will to go all-in is the real difficult question that confronts us in the upcoming LegCo election.
All in all, if “35+” cannot be realised, it is unsurprising to see LegCo being more heavily suppressed in the next 4 years; even if "35+" is achieved, it is questionable whether the pan-democrats are able to weather multiple attacks, verbal or physical, from the regime (judging from its power in the last four years) and utilise the international Laam-chaau strategy against the displacement of LegCo. Adhering to the motto of “we fight on, each in his own way”, I can only hope that Hongkongers in elections, street confrontations and international front can reconcile with each other, so that we may collectively compel the government to yield to our demands in the next six months. It is only by reaching a resolution before a real constitutional crisis that we can combat the institutional violence of the regime and not be devoured by it.
https://hkcolumn.blogspot.com/2020/04/joshua-wong-after-winning-majority-in.html?fbclid=IwAR216gf53pG_j9JOpDfr2GItvjLfrFSekKTPzoEs3-s9KBqvPEwz865P8vw
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pass through cost中文 在 多益達人 林立英文 Facebook 的最佳貼文
【如何在兩個月內買到小米手機
How to Buy a Xiaomi in Two Short Months】
Beijing, Sept. 4th (by Carlos Tejada) -- China’s Xiaomi rose to the top ranks of global smartphone makers in only five years by selling high-spec phones at lowball prices. The phones have been snapped up by Chinese consumers looking for an affordable, homegrown alternative to pricier gadgets made by Apple and Samsung Electronics. Its success has made it China’s most valuable startup and second only to Uber in terms of global valuations.
中國的小米公司僅用了不到五年的時間,藉由以低價銷售高規格手機商品,在全球智慧型手機市場中躍昇至名列前茅的位置。與美國蘋果和南韓三星生產且較為昂貴的智慧型裝置相比,小米公司給中國消費者提供的是可負擔得起的國產化和實惠替代選擇,其產品也屢屢被中國消費者一掃而空。小米公司的成功使它一舉成為中國最具市場價值的新創企業,即使在全球範圍來算,其市值也僅次於 Uber。
So goes the story behind Xiaomi’s rise. Still, there’s one aspect of its business that can be hard to convey to the outside world: Its phones can be very, very, very difficult to buy.
以上便是小米崛起的故事,然而這其中尚有一個難與外界陳述的事實是:小米手機是非常,非常,非常難以購買的。
Xiaomi sells its phones only in China, India and a few other Asian markets. But that’s just the start of the difficulties. In China the company sells its newest phones online in limited batches through what are called flash sales. Xiaomi and analysts say that helps the company cope with demand for new products as it ramps up production.
目前小米公司僅在中國、印度及一些亞洲國家銷售智慧手機,不過這其實只是造成購買困難的第一個因素。小米公司在中國是透過所謂線上分批搶購的方式來銷售其最新機型。小米公司和分析家認為這種銷售方式有助於公司更好地控管新產品產量只能逐步上升可能造成的供不應求狀況。
On a practical level, it means those who aren’t quick enough with a computer mouse may have a long time to wait before they get one.
實際一點來說,這就表示那些使用電腦滑鼠不夠敏捷的人可能就得在買到一台小米手機之前要等上好長一段時間了。
I chose to buy a Xiaomi phone after the company lent me its newest phablet, the Note Pro, to use for a few weeks. I liked the large screen, decent camera and its take on Google’s Android phone-operating software, which in my opinion is still inferior to Apple’s mobile software but is closing the gap. Mostly, I liked the price – the Note Pro costs about half the price of Apple’s base-model iPhone 6 Plus, which is the same size but comes with only a quarter of the memory.
在小米公司把最新型的 Note Pro 智慧型大螢幕手機借給我使用了幾個星期之後,我決定自行購買一台小米手機。我非常喜歡它的大螢幕以及拍照效果不錯的鏡頭。小米手機使用的是 Google 公司的 Android 手機作業系統,雖然 Android 系統跟蘋果公司的 iOS 系統還存在一定差距,但這個差距正逐漸縮小中。我最在意的還是價格:小米 Note Pro 的售價僅為蘋果公司 iPhone 6 Plus 基本款(16 GB)的一半,且這兩台手機的尺寸一樣,而 Note Pro 的記憶體容量足足為 iPhone 6 Plus 的 4 倍 (64 GB)。
Another reason I liked it: In China-nerd circles, the phone is a conversation starter. People who follow China or technology but who aren’t on the mainland rarely see one. In that crowd everybody has an opinion of Xiaomi, ranging from respect for a scrappy startup to contempt for a cheap copycat. “Oh, you have a Xiaomi?” they ask, with some mix of curiosity and amusement.
我喜歡小米手機的另一個理由是,在愛好中國事物的群體之中,小米手機總是一個很不錯的開場白,因為關注中國或者科技產品但身不在中國的人很少能看見小米手機。那個群體的人對於小米都有各自的看法,有的人對這個草莽的新創公司表達尊重,也有人輕蔑地認為小米手機僅僅是廉價的山寨產品。他們會帶著愉悅和好奇問說:「哦?你的是小米手機?」
I chose to buy my phone like most Chinese people buy theirs: through an online flash sale. I skipped online brokers and secondhand dealers over concerns about malware and fakes. I also declined an offer from Xiaomi for a pass that would let me jump to the front of the line, an inducement it offers to its biggest Mi fans.
我選擇採用大多數在中國的消費者們所使用的方式來購買小米手機:線上搶購。出於對惡意軟體和假貨問題的擔憂,我略過了從網路賣家和二手交易者那邊購買的方案。我還放棄了小米公司提供的「插隊」優待,這對於廣大的「米粉」族來說可是項福利啊。
I went in with a co-worker, Olivia, who wanted to buy a budget-level phone for her father.
我和我的同事 Olivia 一起進行搶購,而她想幫她爸爸購買一台經濟實惠的手機。
Day 1第 1 天
Xiaomi holds its flash sales on Tuesdays at noon sharp. To buy one, a customer needs access to a Chinese debit or credit card or an account with an online payment system like Alibaba Group’s Alipay affiliate. With all those in check, I perched over my computer with my mouse at the ready.
小米在週二中午整點展開了一次搶購活動,想要參與的消費者必須擁有中國記帳卡、信用卡或者像隸屬阿里巴巴公司的支付寶那樣的線上付款系統。一切就緒以後,我手握滑鼠靜候在電腦旁邊嚴陣以待。
As it turns out, there’s another helpful prerequisite: An ability to read fine print in Chinese. My noontime click generated a message congratulating me for registering to try to buy a Xiaomi phone. The fine print on the website said people trying to buy a phone must first register on the site. My first true opportunity, it told me, would be next Tuesday.
有一個先決條件更能使我們成功搶購到手機:你需要具備讀懂中國文字的能力。我算好正午時間點下按鈕之後出現一個視窗,是一條恭喜資訊:小米網站祝賀我註冊成功,並可以開始嘗試搶購小米手機。網站上的中文有提示希望搶購小米手機的用戶必須先在網站進行註冊,我成功註冊以後的第一次嘗試機會變成了下週二。
Day 8第 8 天
Primed and registered, I set off with my mouse promptly at noon as if a starter’s pistol had gone off next to my ear. Two pages of options popped up on my browser. I read the Chinese as quickly as I could and clicked away.
確認註冊成功,且一切就緒以後,我又一次算準正午時分點下了滑鼠,那時的聲音就像是起跑槍的聲音從我耳邊呼嘯而過。隨後瀏覽器上出現了兩個頁面,我盡可能快速地閱讀了上面的中文資訊並隨後點了關閉。
Xiaomi’s mascot – a white rabbit named Mitu wearing a green Chinese army hat – popped up on my screen. It appeared to be running in place. The text explained that too many people were trying to buy phones too. “I’m lined up and currently moving forward with everything I’ve got,” it said.
小米的吉祥物,一隻戴著綠色中國軍帽,名為「米兔」的兔子出現在我的螢幕之上,一切看似順利。但上面的文字卻顯示目前搶購小米手機的人數已經太多,而且頁面一直顯示「正在排隊中」。
It ran with everything it had for the next 20 minutes. I wondered how long it would take for me to find out whether I had won my phone.
結果20 分鐘過去了,頁面所顯示的內容還是一樣,我當時就很好奇還需要等多久我才會知道是否搶到了手機。
A colleague, Yang Jie, walked by and sighed. “You didn’t get it, Carlos,” she said. Sure enough, the image soon changed to a Mitu gushing tears. “Sorry, we’re already sold out,” it said.
這時我一位同事Yang Jie經過並嘆了一口氣。她說:「Carlos,你沒有搶到。」果不其然,頁面隨後便出現了一隻淚水狂噴的米兔。上面寫著:「非常抱歉,我們已經售罄。」
I looked to Olivia, who shook her head. Sold out too.
我望向 Olivia 那兒,她搖了搖頭,顯然她也沒有搶到。
Day 15第 15 天
I noticed this time that Xiaomi offers potential buyers the option of ordering the Xiaomi phone for guaranteed delivery in a month. I snorted. Waiting, I decided, is for chumps. I’m not a chump. I’m a champ. Surely I can click as fast as anybody.
這次我注意到小米為潛在購買者提供了預約購買的服務,並保證在一個月內進行配送。我對此冷哼一聲。我主意已決,這種等待方案是準備給傻瓜的,但我並不是一個傻瓜,我是一個贏家,我肯定可以比別人更快點下滑鼠。
Apparently not. This time the crying Mitu quickly replaced the running Mitu. Sold out. On to next week.
結果根本事與願違,這次哭泣的米兔很快便取代跑步的米兔出現在了螢幕之上。再次售罄,只好再等到下個星期了。
But not with Olivia. Twice was enough, and she dropped out. “It’s too hard,” she said.
不過這次 Olivia 並沒有參與,因為她覺得兩次嘗試就夠了所以罷手。她說:「這太難了」。
Day 22第 22 天
I was on the phone with a colleague in Hong Kong when the trumpets from theme music of China’s national noon television broadcast blared across the newsroom. Noon! I scrambled to my open browser. Those precious seconds may have cost me. The crying Mitu mocked my inattention. Vigilance is the price of flash sales.
當時我在跟一位在香港的同事講電話,隨後我聽到了中國午間新聞的主題音樂。又到正午了!我習慣性反射地衝到開啟的瀏覽器前面,每一秒鐘都太寶貴了。哭泣的米兔再一次無情地嘲笑著我不夠投入的搶購行為。在進行秒殺搶購的時候警惕性實在是太重要了。
Day 29第 29 天
Xiaomi says it sells phones in limited batches strictly for production reasons, not to stoke demand through what’s known as scarcity marketing. “We have to monitor the demand for our smartphones, and produce our inventory accordingly, which requires us to use the flash sale model,” a spokeswoman said.
小米公司稱其之所以採用限量搶購的方式主要是由於產能問題,而並非像所傳的那樣利用所謂的「饑餓行銷」來刺激需求。「我們必須對自己智慧手機的銷量進行監控,並據此對庫存及產能進行調整,因此我們只能選擇限量搶購的模式。」小米公司的一位女發言人這麼說。
Whatever the reason, it resulted in a crying Mitu on my screen.
不管理由是什麼,最終我的螢幕上還是再度出現了一隻哭泣的米兔。
Day 36第 36 天
Hello again, you crying little lapin tease. Had I chosen to be a chump, instead of a champ, I’d have my Xiaomi by now.
再次見到了米兔的哭臉嘲諷。如果當初能自認蠢蛋,不要選擇當贏家的話,現在我應該已經把小米手機拿到手了。
Still, I wasn’t frustrated. More curious. Was it possible, in fact, to buy a Xiaomi phone?
但我並沒有感到沮喪,只是更加好奇用搶購這種方式的消費者究竟能否買到小米手機?
Day 42第 42 天
Noon on Tuesday in China came at 9 p.m. Monday at the airport in Phoenix, where I was schlepping two children from one set of grandparents to another. I thought about telling my wife I wanted to put down our luggage and pause our U.S. vacation while I try to buy a phone in China from a company that uses a militant rabbit as a mascot. I thought about the divorce proceedings. I kept silent.
中國週二的正午是美國鳳凰城(Phoenix)週一早上 9 點,當時我在鳳凰城的機場內,手上抱著兩個孩子,我剛把他們從祖父母處接回,現在正前往外祖父母的住處。當時我想要告訴太太我想放下行李並暫停我們的度假,因為我正嘗試從一家以軍裝兔子作為吉祥物的公司處搶購一台手機。只是在我想到了離婚的訴訟程序之後,我選擇了保持沉默。
Day 49第 49 天
I just plain forgot.
我壓根兒忘記了有搶購這件事情。
Day 55第 55 天
I logged into Xiaomi’s Chinese site the day before the Tuesday auction to register for the big showto be greeted with a message that the Note Pro was available for immediate sale. The Xiaomi spokeswoman later said that “we move from flash sales to open sales after we determine the exact alignment of demand and supply accordingly.” My Xiaomi would be waiting at my desk in Beijing when I returned.
我在週二的搶購開始之前就先登入小米的中文網頁,結果登入後我看到一則訊息說小米 Note Pro 已經可以即時購買。隨後小米公司的女發言人表示:「在確認了供應量能夠滿足需求量以後,我們決定將銷售方式從限量搶購調整為公開銷售。」在我回到北京的時候我的小米手機就已經躺在我桌子上等著我了。
TZ Wong, an analyst with research firm Canalys, says Xiaomi will need to broaden its distribution channels, “especially if it wants to achieve its ambitious 80 million to 100 million smartphone target for this year.” The Xiaomi spokeswoman said it doesn’t pursue market-share targets.
市場調查及研究機構Canalys 的分析師 TZ Wong 表示小米公司必須拓展其分配銷售的管道,「特別是如果他們想在今年達成 8 千萬至 1 億的銷售目標後。」但小米的女發言人稱公司並不以追求市場佔有率為目標。
My phone works fine so far. Does it work two-months’-wait fine? That’s between me and the Mitu.
目前我的手機運作的狀況一切良好,不過這支手機真的值得這兩個月的苦苦等候嗎?這個問題就留給我和米兔吧。
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